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SUMMARY 
 
This paper aims to account for the formation of an interstate system in East Asia in the 
1990s. International trading system in one form or another has continued to exist in the 
area since the medieval and especially modern eras. In contrast, we have had no 
autonomous interstate system until very recently. Before the Second World War, most of 
the Asian nations were Western or Japanese colonies, and thus they did not have even a 
fragment of their own international political system. But now all the nations in Asia are 
independent, and in addition, they have established their own way of political 
interactions among themselves. In this paper the author gathers data on changes in the 
diplomatic relationships among countries in the area after the end of the Second World 
War to probe into the systemic formation. His findings are that an autonomous interstate 
system has been at work in East Asia since the 1990s. Southeast Asian countries have 
played a leading part in forming it since the mid-1970s. Although China during the 
Great Cultural Revolution, and Vietnam after unification were once revolutionary, hence 
major turbulent actors, now both have become normal states in diplomatic terms. The 
end of the Cold-War in the early 1990s brought about the global milieu favorable to the 
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formation of the interstate system in East Asia. Besides, North Korea does not look to 
be so turbulent as generally said, as it seems to be seeking more favorable international 
settings. Finally, Japanese specialists on Asia regard an Asian region as containing local 
international or world systems, each of which, in their views, possesses an integrity but 
whose function is flexible, multiple and/or overlapping. In this regard, the interstate 
system in East Asia is judged to be a case, although its functions are formal, basic and 
fixed within its range. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the diplomatic relationships among East Asian countries after 
the end of the Second World War up to the present, probing into their systemic 
transformation. During the period under discussion, there have been great domestic and 
international changes in Asian politics. Some of them have delayed, and the others have 
promoted the emergence of the interstate system in the area. 
Firstly, Japan and Thailand were only two countries in Asia that were 
independent in the pre-War time. However, soon after the War, other Asian nations 
regained independence: the Philippines in 1946, India in 1947, Burma and the two 
Koreas (the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) in 1948, 
China (the founding of the People’s Democratic Republic of China as a complete 
sovereign state ending its former status of a semi-colony) and Indonesia in 1949, Laos 
and Cambodia in 1953, and Malaya in 1957 (later Malaysia in 1963), and Singapore in 
1965 (formerly a part of Malaysia). In Indochina, Vietnamese struggles for 
independence led to the first Indo-Chinese War in November 1946, and the Geneva 
Agreement on its conclusion in July 1954 brought about two Vietnamese states (the 
Vietnamese Democratic Republic in the North and the State of Vietnam/the Vietnamese 
Republic in the South). Independence of those countries was an essential prerequisite 
for the formation of an Asian interstate system.  
Secondly, the founding of the three socialist countries - North Korea, China 
and North Vietnam (the unified Vietnam since 1976) - has greatly affected international 
politics in East Asia. In the Korean Peninsula the Korean War broke out on 25 June 
1950 when North Korean armies invaded South Korea, crossing their border. This 
domestic war became internecine and international, as the United States and later China 
(the Chinese People’s Voluntary Forces) took part in it. The Armistice Agreement was 
concluded in July 1953. Meanwhile, in Indochina, the national liberation war entered 
the second stage in 1960. It intensified in 1962 when the United States started to engage 
in it on a large scale, supporting the South Vietnamese Government and its forces. The 
second Indo-Chinese (Vietnamese) war was fought between South Vietnam and the 
United States on the one hand, and the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front and 
North Vietnam on the other. It ended in the victory of the latter when the United States 
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forces retreated in March 1973 and the Government in Saigon collapsed in April 1975. 
In China, the United States dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Straits of Taiwan in 
support of the Nationalist Government in Taipei soon after the outbreak of the Korean 
War. Thus, in contrast to the cold war in Europe, war in Asia became ‘hot,’ and thus the 
founding of an independent Asian interstate system was considerably delayed. 
Thirdly, the international milieu surrounding Asia has radically changed since 
the early 1990s. Needless to say, the ending of the Cold War in the early 1990s brought 
about a completely new set of rules to this area as well. For example, although the 
Soviet Union, adopting the Cold War strategy, had been a major actor in Asian politics 
up to the late 1980s, now Russia cannot afford to intervene in it. Besides, global and 
regional organizations centering around the United Nations have gained momentum in 
the post Cold War international arena. Moreover, in the economic sphere, the Asian 
region has increasingly become a new center in accordance with its remarkable 
economic growth, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), founded in 
1989, is a prominent example of economic cooperation schemes in the Asia-Pacific. 
Moreover, in this connection, ‘Asia-Pacific’ has come to be accepted as a geo-economic 
concept. Thus, by the 1990s, the international milieu had been firmly set up for 
promoting an interstate system in Asia. 
Fourthly, Asian politics has become bipolar or tri-polar since the 1970s. The 
new pole is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was founded 
in 1967 by its original member countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and 
the Philippines) and joined by Brunei in 1984. Having started as an organ against the 
Socialist Vietnam, ASEAN has expanded to accept Vietnam as its member in 1995, 
Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. The original members of ASEAN 
also promoted the founding of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996, which works 
as a consultative body based on the principle of equality among the major countries in 
Asia and Europe. ASEM exemplifies the rise of Asian countries as important players in 
world politics today, which is quite a contrast to the past. Then the West played as 
colonial powers, whereas most Asian nations were subjected to them as the colonized. 
The traditional pole(s) in Asian politics lies in East Asia, which can be divided into 
China on the one hand, and Korea and Japan on the other. In other words, East Asia in a 
narrow sense is considered to have either one or two poles. Accordingly, East Asia in a 
 - 75 - 
wide sense can be either bipolar or tri-polar. Either way, we can now recognize the 
strong political voices of the member countries of ASEAN, something which were 
totally unthinkable fifty years ago. Their initiatives have been a major factor of the 
formation of an interstate system in Asia. 
Finally, in the political sphere, after independence most of the countries in Asia 
sooner or later have come to govern by an authoritarian regime. In the economic sphere, 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have succeeded in export-oriented 
industrialization and been the economic powers since the late 1970s. Their strategy was 
based on a combination of development politics or dictatorship and rapid economic 
growth. In the 1990s, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia followed suit, and so did the 
Communist China, which began to adopt the ‘Reform and Open Policy’ in the late 
1970s. In politics, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand moved to 
democracy in the late 1980s – the early 1990s, and Indonesia in the late 1990s, but  
authoritarian regimes still exist in North Korea, China, Vietnam, Myanmar, Malaysia, 
and Singapore. Dynamism for economic growth and democracy has become 
increasingly stronger in domestic politics in most of the Asian countries in these years. 
In particular,  economic developmentalism has become a common cultural norm 
supporting an interstate system in Asia. 
In the next section, the author shall gather factual data on bilateral diplomatic 
relationships among East Asian countries, and in the third section, show the genesis of 
an interstate system in the region in the 1990s. We shall then juxtapose our findings in 
the context of Japanese discourses on Asian systems. Finally, we shall explore their 
implications for rectifying our image of Asia. 
 
2. Formation of Bilateral Diplomatic Relationships in East Asia 
 
The term ‘Asia’ in this paper refers to East Asia, from which South Asia and the Pacific 
region are excluded. ‘East Asia’ has a single meaning in Japanese usage, which refers to 
Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mongolia. Although Siberia can be 
included in the region in geographical and economic terms, it is usually excluded from 
it in cultural and political terms, as is done here. In contrast, ‘East Asia’ has two 
meanings in the English usage. One is a narrow concept identical with the Japanese 
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usage, and the other, a broad concept in which the Southeast Asian countries (the 
Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, Malays ia, Singapore, 
Indonesia, and Brunei) are also included. Here the author defines Asia to mean East 
Asia in the broad sense above. This selection has two reasons. One is grounded on a 
view in the economic history that stresses the former prosperity of the region as a set of 
trading zones among Chinese tributary and other Southeast Asian maritime trade 
systems. The second reason derives from the latest facts that East Asian (in the narrow 
sense) and Southeast Asian countries have formed a firm regional integr ity in the 
economic sense, and that they strive for some regional cooperation in the political sense 
too. 
The author tried to collect all data on matrices of bilateral formal relationships 
among those Asian countries. Although we still miss some data, especially concerning 
Mongol and Laos, we have those data that are available for observing important 
systemic changes in the interstate relationship. Table 1 shows Japan’s relationship with 
Asian countries in the latter half of the twentieth century. Japan has formal relationship 
with all of those countries except North Korea. It maintains informal but substantial 
relationship with Taiwan. In the 1940s-1960s, it approved none of Communist 
governments in North Korea, Mongol, China and North Vietnam. Its implication is that 
Japanese diplomatic lines were completely divided along the East-West confrontation, 
and Japan set itself on the side of the West under the strong US influences. For instance, 
during the Vietnam War, it supported American military operations by providing the US 
with the military bases in Okinawa and other benefits. But already in the early 1970s 
before the end of the war, it established diplomatic relationship with such Communist 
countries as China and Mongol in 1972, and North Vietnam in 1973. This was in part an 
act of escape from the Cold War framework between the East and the West. 
However, in the 1980s, after Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978, 
Japan ruptured the formal relationship with Cambodia (Heng Samrin and Hun Sen 
governments) under Vietnamese influences, and also chose to freeze the formal 
relationship with Vietnam. Meanwhile, from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, Japan 
tried to restore order in Cambodia with China’s consent, working together with ASEAN 
countries, especially with Thailand. (Ikeda 1996) One of the two major aims was to 
prevent Vietnam from becoming a local great power on the Indo-Chinese Peninsula, and 
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the other, to restore order in Cambodia by depriving Pol Pot and his faction of military 
and political power. Eventually Japan established the formal relationship again with 
Vietnam in 1991 and Cambodia in 1992. Furthermore, as widely known, Japan is the 
only country in Asia that was admitted as a full member state into the Western State 
System before the Second World War. Now, all of the Asian states are entitled to the 
membership of the global interstate system, sharing the equal partnership. This is totally 
different from that in the pre-War period when Asian nations were subjugated as 
Western or Japanese (semi-)colonies. Now Japan has squarely to face it. 
South Korea was under much stronger influences of the Cold War than Japan. 
In 1950 South Korea was involved in the Korean War that was initiated by North Korea 
for the purpose of ‘liberation’ of South Korea. Thereafter, South Korea has faced the 
military threat from the North without interruption. Its formal relationship with (former) 
Communist countries came to be established only during the 1990s: with the Soviet 
Union in 1990, Mongol in 1990, China and Vietnam in 1992, Laos in 1995, and 
Cambodia in 1997. Referring back to the 1970s, it had no formal relationship with 
Indonesia until 1973, and Myanmar and Singapore until 1975. We may be able to say 
that Korean economic miracle, achieved in the 1970s-80s, was also a political miracle 
under the most unfavorable international conditions. Its establishment of diplomatic 
relationship with China is also to be noted, since it was a big surprise, given the old 
Chinese World Order. 
In Asia there used to be the Chinese World Order. It was Sino-centric, and also 
based on the assumptions that Chinese culture is superior to every other culture in the 
world, and that the ethical norms of Confucianism constitute ‘civilization.’ These 
notions of superior culture and ethics were embodied in the Chinese State and 
personified by the Chinese Emperor, the Son of the Heaven. The order was based on a 
dichotomy of the civilized China (the Center of the World) and the uncivilized 
Barbarians (the peoples surrounding the Center: Korean, Japanese, Mongolian, 
Vietnamese, Tibetan, and others ; in which Europeans were also included theoretically). 
The relationship between the Center and the surrounding countries crystallized into a 
t’se-feng relationship where the Emperor was to ‘invest’(feng) a number of 
‘vassals’(fan) who in turn paid ‘tribute’ to him. While a ‘tribute’ and the feeling of 
gratitude were due to come from the bottom upward, the legitimacy of each kingdom, 
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its military protection (in case of being invaded by others), higher culture, and trade 
benefits were due to flow from the top downward. (Fairbank 1968) The construct of the 
Order was hierarchical, in contrast with that of the Western State System among the 
inner member states on the basis of equality principle. China and Korea have never 
established equal partnership till 1992. This establishment of modern diplomatic 
relationship between the two was thus a great event, historically unprecedented in the 
region. Both countries are now equals for the first time throughout history. This is a 
starting point for the Western type of modern diplomacy between China and Korea. 
Table 3 discloses North Korea’s formal relationship with Asian countries and 
two outside major powers. North Korea’s case is noteworthy in two senses: dissimilarity 
and similarity with South Korea. In principle, its relationship with Communist and 
former Communist countries (Mongol, China, North Vietnam, the united Vietnam, and 
the Soviet Union) has been in order, and it has kept good relationship with Prince 
Sihanouk of Cambodia as well. This is quite a contrast to South Korean policy that had 
no formal relationship with those countries until the 1990s. But similarity was found 
when North Korea established diplomatic relationship with Southeast Asian countries in 
the mid-1970s - Malaysia in 1973, Laos in 1974, and Thailand, Myanmar (to be 
ruptured due to the bombing operation by their operators in 1983) and Singapore in 
1975. The mid-1970s was the time when Asian countries, liberal and Communist, did 
their best to establish an interstate system within this region. It should have been the 
first turning point in the Asian international system in history.  
Now North Korea has diplomatic relationship with most of the Asian countries 
(Brunei in 1999 and the Philippines in 2000). Still its relationship with Japan, South 
Korea and the US is informal. Viewed in this way, North Korea has been striving to 
extend diplomatic networks further. It is the US and Japan that have tried to contain the 
country. It does not seem that North Korea is containing itself within a narrow circle. 
That country is not so much isolated from the outside world as is generally imagined. 
For instance, at the end of 1990, while South Korea had diplomatic relationship with 
145 countries, North Korea had with 105 countries. Then eighty-nine countries held 
diplomatic ties with both of them. Among the Asia-Pacific countries, twenty-eight 
countries had diplomatic relationship with South Korea, while nineteen countries did 
with North Korea, and fifteen countries with both of them. (Kankoku Kita-chôsen Sôran 
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1993: 311-2) 
As shown in Table 4, China is now fully accepted into the Asian interstate 
system. In the late-1980s and early-1990s, it established diplomatic relationship with 
Singapore in 1990, Brunei in 1991, and South Korea in 1992 (mentioned above). It 
reestablished the relationship with Indonesia in 1990, and with Vietnam in 1991. Since 
the establishment of the Communist Government in Beijing in 1949, its diplomacy has 
been very dynamic throughout the last fifty years, with the ebb and flow of diplomatic 
tides. In the 1950s, China, together with India, Indonesia and Burma, formed the 
leading bloc at the top of the newly independent states or those nations striving for 
independence in Asia and Africa. But in the late-1960s, the Cultural Revolution made 
China break off relations with even Communist or friendly countries. In the 1970s, 
however, China took over the diplomatic relations with the US from Taiwan, whereas in 
the 1970s-1980s it ruptured ties with the Soviet Union that was its former revolutionary 
ally. In addition, in the late February through the early March of 1979 China waged 
‘punitive’ war against Vietnam, who had invaded Cambodia at the end of 1978 under 
the pretext of assisting Heng Samrin government from Pol Pot forces. The Chinese 
operation in Vietnam did not prove so successful, whereas in Cambodia China 
continued to help Pol Pot and Sihanouk factions throughout the 1980s, militarily or 
politically. Eventually in the 1990s it abandoned its support for Pol Pot faction, whereas 
it maintained good relationship with Sihanouk in Cambodian politics. Finally we should 
also note that Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines established diplomatic relationship 
with China in the mid-1970s. As mentioned above, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, and  
Singapore improved the relationship with North Korea respectively in the mid-1970s, 
while Myanmar, Singapore, and Indonesia did so with South Korea in the same period. 
Hence the mid-1970s almost became a turning point in the history of Asian international 
relations, which was later overturned by an aggressive Vietnam. 
China took part in the Korean War, and supported North Vietnam and the 
National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. These two wars (Korea and Vietnam) are 
generally considered to typify the military confrontation between the East and the West 
in the Cold-War context. Although the Korean War encompassed direct warfare 
between China and the US, the relationships among US, China and the Soviet were 
more complicated in the context of the Vietnam War. The US took part in warfare on the 
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side of South Vietnamese Government. But neither the Soviet Union nor China joined 
warfare on the national liberation side of Vietnam in a directly military way, although 
China and the Soviet Union claimed to fully support the Vietnamese people’s struggles 
for liberation. Actually the conflicts between China and the Soviet Union were 
accelerating at a fast pace, whereas the former foes, the US and China, were searching 
for a form of united front against the Soviet Union in the early 1970s. These situations 
are better explained by the framework of power politics or the balance of power than 
that of fixed confrontation between the member states of the two opposing blocs. In this 
limited sense, it could be said that the Cold War was over in Asia more than ten years 
earlier before the official end of the Cold War (1989). Nevertheless, the image of the 
Cold War lingered on in the region still in the 1980s and even in the 1990s, maintained 
mainly by the US and Japan. South Korea might have been more concerned with the 
confrontation with North than the Cold War at large. 
Table 5 shows the case of Vietnamese diplomacy. Vietnam was divided into 
North Communist and South ‘Liberal’ Governments until the unification under North 
Vietnam in 1976. Accordingly international supporters were also divided into two 
camps of the North and the South. A case was the Vietnam War. After unification, 
Vietnam kept its national integrity up to the present. Asian countries recognized the 
legitimacy of North Vietnam even before unification, or that of the unified Vietnam 
immediately after it (Japan and Singapore in 1973, Malaysia in 1975, and Thailand, 
Indonesia and the Philippines in 1976). Here too, the mid-1970s appeared to be a 
turning point in Asian international history. But, after Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 
December 1978 to provide Heng Samrin and his faction with military support, 
Vietnam’s foreign relations came to be divided into two groups again. This time, one 
was a group formed by the Soviet Union and its allies (Mongol) supportive of Heng 
Samrin’s and Hun Sen’s faction, and the other was a group mainly consisting of Japan, 
China, and ASEAN member states that supported Pol Pot’s and/or Sihanouk’s factions 
in a military and/or political way. At that time Vietnam itself was a great destabilizer in 
the embryonic interstate system in the region. It was only after the withdrawal of 
Vietnamese forces from Cambodia in 1989 that Vietnam could formally recover friendly 
relations with Asian countries (Japan, China, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines). In addition, it established diplomatic relationship with 
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South Korea and Brunei in 1992, and the US in 1995. Today Vietnam, pursuing the ‘Doi 
Moi’ policy, is no longer a revolutionary (f)actor in international politics in East Asia.  
Table 6 shows Malaysia’s diplomatic relationship since its independence in 
1963. Malaysia’s independence from Britain brought about territorial or legitimacy 
issues with the two neighboring countries (the Philippines and Indonesia), and the 
severance of diplomatic relationship with them, once or twice within the following few 
years. At least in the early-1960s, it was not the Vietnam War but those conflicts, 
ensuing from Malaysia’s independence, that created the image of a turbulent Southeast 
Asia. (Yamakage 2000: 135) However, Malaysia, together with the Philippines, 
Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia, soon formed the ASEAN in 1967 so as to contain 
the Communist forces within Indo-Chinese Peninsula. Moreover, it displayed a unique 
way of diplomacy, coping with Communist forces within as well as without. It did not 
recognize either of the two Chinese Governments (Beijing and Taipei) until it finally 
recognized the Beijing Government in 1974. It established diplomatic relationship with 
Mongol in 1971 and North Korea in 1973. Malaysian diplomacy is typical in the 
ASEAN countries. Thus the member countries acted similarly when they established 
diplomatic relationship with Communist countries in Asia in the mid-1970s, and more 
or less similarly when they put great pressure on Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia 
and persuaded Sihanouk faction, and possibly Pol Pot faction, to create order from 
within. 
 
3. Formation of an Asian Interstate System 
 
We can obtain matrices of interstate relationship in Asia by accumulating all of the 
bilateral diplomatic relationship, six cases of which were observed in the above. The 
matrices render us some findings on the formation and deformation of an interstate 
system in East Asia. In the mid-1960s the framework of the Cold War was dominant in 
the region, where the Communist and the ‘Liberal’ blocs were clearly demarcated (see 
Table 7). In the mid-1970s, especially after the unification of Vietnam (1976), some 
kind of an interstate system should have been formed on the initiative of ASEAN 
member states (see Table 8). However, it was the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam (at 
the end of 1978) that destroyed the new dynamism. As a result, in the 1980s, Vietnam 
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and Cambodia under Hen Samrin’s and Hun Sen’s premiership respectively came to be 
isolated from the rest of the Asian countries. The emergent system in Asia became 
chaotic (see Table 9). However, since the end of the 1980s, Japan, China, Thailand and 
other ASEAN members practiced a kind of concerted diplomacy, persuading that 
Vietnam should withdraw its military forces from Cambodia and political factions in 
Cambodia should cooperate with each other to restore order in an appropriate way. 
Eventually, the Vietnamese forces withdrew back home in September 1989, and in 
Cambodia the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was set up 
in March 1992 as an intermediary for the nation rebuilding. In September 1993 
Kingdom of Cambodia started anew.  
In the 1990s, locally the détente in the Indo-Chinese Peninsula, and globally 
the end of the Cold War and the domestic as well as international collapse of the former 
Soviet bloc brought about the conditions that enabled East Asia to construct an 
interstate system based on equality. In the late-1990 the system appeared on the surface, 
provided that Taiwan enjoyed not formal (political) but informal (economic and 
cultural) relations with all nations in the region and that North Korea had diplomatic 
relations with Asian nations except South Korea, Japan and Myanmar (see Table 10). 
Thus in principle a network of diplomatic relations is well established, connecting 
almost all nations in East Asia. We can define it as an international system due to the 
following reasons. 
As to the concept of system, we like to refer to the definition in The Oxford 
English Dictionary. It defines ‘system’ to be (1) a set or assemblage of things connected, 
associated, or interdependent, so as to form a complex unity, or (2) a whole composed 
of parts in orderly arrangement according to some scheme or plan. In studies of 
international politics, the conception of ‘system’ has been used mainly in two ways: 
international system, and world system(s). The term ‘international system’ is a concept 
for analysis or description of international politics. Used as an analytical term, it is 
predicated upon a definite notion of system. But it is not necessarily so when it is used 
to describe situations of international relations at a given time. The term ‘international 
system’ came to be accepted as an academic term in the late 1950s, soon becoming 
fashionable, but more or less obsolete in the late 1990s. 
While the first part of OED definition is more extensive in usage, the second is 
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limited to such cases as those related to a preconceived scheme or plan. When we 
extrapolate this contrast to international relations, we come across the argument 
developed by H.Bull in elaborating on the distinction between international system and 
society. As to the former, he defines: A system of states (or international system) is 
formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have 
sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in some 
measure – as parts of a whole (Bull 1977: 9-10). This corresponds very well to the first 
definition of system noted above. Turning to international society, he defines: A society 
of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain 
common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and 
share in the working of common institutions (Bull 1977: 13). If we borrow Bull’s 
concepts, international relations have been rapidly changing from international system 
to international society in the post-Cold War era. In the Asian context, an autonomous 
system of states was formed in the 1990s for the first time in history, and it has already 
acquired some elements of international society.  
The basis of the Asian system is a modified version of the Western State 
System, deprived of the function of Western dominance. The Western State System was 
quintessentially Western-centric, where legitimate actors were limited to the sovereign 
states in the West. While it brought development, wealth, and state-building to Western 
nations, it destroyed non-Western nations in terms of politics, economics, society, and 
culture. The system embraced a practical code of inter-state behavior, comprising a 
double standard of behavioral code, one applied to Western nations, and the other to 
non-Western nations. While Western nations acted as equals to each other in principle, 
they treated polities outside the West in such discriminatory ways as they considered 
appropriate. The core of the inward code was threefold: national sovereignty, the 
balance of power, and international law. The ideal type of states was nation-states. 
Dependent on the outward code, the Westerner would never easily admit that the 
non-Western nations also have sovereignty. The West regarded non-Western nations as a 
target of Western mercantilism, colonialism, and imperialism. Moreover, they tried to 
destroy any indigenous industrialization in the rest of the world, particula rly that in Asia 
which had been far more ahead of the West in this respect until the mid-eighteenth 
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century. Globally speaking, the 1960s was epoch-making in the international system, as 
was expressed in such significant incidents as the emergence of ‘African years,’ the 
finding of ‘the North-South problem,’ the impasse of ‘the nuclear stalemate,’ or the 
assertion of ‘international interdependence.’ In the current international system, the 
outward code in the Western State System has ceased to function, and the equality 
principle applies to all the states. (Hatsuse 1993: 279-288) 
A network of interstate relations in Asia must encompass those principles or 
rules that prescribe actions or behavior of all the elements (i.e. states) comprising the 
network, if it is defined to be a system. In the Western State System, there were the 
principles of mutual respect of sovereignty, international law, and the balance-of-power. 
In the emergent Asian interstate system, the first two principles among three - 
sovereignty and international law - are in principle observed, but there is no 
balance-of-power system in a military sense. To take account of the ‘balance of power’, 
we can borrow an idea from M. Kaplan’s analytic model of international systems. In his 
definition, he elucidates six rules of ‘balance-of-power’ system, one of which refers to a 
principle of coalition formation. This rule posits that actors act to oppose any coalition 
or single actor which tends to assume a position of predominance over the rest of the 
system. (Kaplan 1957: 22-23). This fits very well with the situation surrounding 
Vietnam in the 1980s in a political, though not military, sense. Referring to the 
Cambodian peace process, T. Shiraishi, who specializes in Southeast Asian politics, 
observes, ‘Its real target was not Cambodia, but Vietnam, that is, to “solve” the 
Cambodian question, stop bleeding Vietnam, promote economic cooperation with it, 
and make it part of ASEAN-led Southeast Asia.’ (Katzenstein and Shiraishi 19797: 
1889) As Yamakage, being an ASEAN specialist, notes, ASEAN and the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) are nothing but loose military constructs that rely only on 
confidence building measures (CBM). ASEAN has actually promoted CBM in a 
substantial sense by trial and error, but without adopting it as the official policy term. 
(Yamakage 2000) The ASEAN member states, China, and Japan displayed a sort of 
concerted containment policy against Vietnam in the late 1980s – the early 1990s, 
which can be taken as an extension of CBM idea pursued by the ASEAN member states. 
This can be also considered as a sort of the balance-of-power policy, though in the 
non-military sense, achieved by all the concerned states. 
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This system has had two turbulent factors: revolutionary states and the US 
hegemony. As for the former, China during the Great Cultural Revolution and Vietnam 
after unification were two outstanding cases. In the 1960s-70s, China in the Great 
Cultural Revolution chose the policy of isolation by breaking down most of its 
pre-existing foreign relations. In the 1970s-80s, Vietnam played the role of a 
destabilizer in the region by invading Cambodia. Not until the beginning of the 1990s 
when both the Cold War and the Second Vietnam had came to the end, we had no viable 
interstate system working in Asia. Today, in contrast, both China and Vietnam have 
already gone normal. Neither does North Korea look to be so turbulent as generally said, 
as it seems to be seeking more favorable international settings. Despite the containment 
policy of the US and Japan, North Korea’s foreign policy seems to be more open than 
generally considered. The confrontation between North and South Koreas is considered 
to be more domestic or national than foreign or international. As for the second 
turbulent factor, the US has had both stabilizing and destabilizing roles. It acted as a 
stabilizer in the Korean War and an initiator and destabilizer in Vietnam. We can be 
neither too optimistic nor pessimistic about its future functions.  
Analytically, the Asian international system is a subsystem of the global 
international system, which is often system-dominant. (Kaplan 1957) If we take the 
Asian system as an independent system, we must deal with the global system as an 
environmental factor. As is often the case, the Cold War system dominated the Asian 
international politics until the 1980. But even in the 1970s-80s, the latter was not a 
pawn of the former but an independent player on its own. When we see East Asia as an 
international system, we must define the US, the former Soviet Union (or Russia), the 
EU, and others as environmental factors. Needless to say, the US and the Soviet Union 
were two major actors in Asian political issues, as were apparent in the Korean War and 
the Vietnam War. In this context they were not outside but inside the area. Here, 
however, we would like to shed light on the internal relationship among the Asian 
nations, setting aside those big Powers as external factors in the environment, for we 
can see a lot of regional initiatives in the interrelationship of those Asian countries. 
Asian nations could not afford to enjoy the so-called ‘long peace’ during the 
Cold War period. As A. Tanaka notes, in the post-War period (up to the 1980s), 
ninety-three wars occurred in the world, with almost twelve million war dead. Although 
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only a third of the wars occurred in Asia (down to Pakistan in the West), the death toll 
reached half of those who died in the wars. It is evident that war in Asia was more 
ferocious than in other areas. There were three areas of war: Northeast Asia involving 
China as a major actor, Indochina centering on Vietnam, and Southeast Asian insular 
area revolving around Indonesia. While the first two were connected through Chinese 
and/or American involvement, the third was more endogenous than exogenous. The first 
two groups of war were fought on a lager scale, reinforced by the logic and strategy of 
the Cold War. To enumerate the number of war dead in these two war groups, we have 
1,000,000 (the Civil War in China, 1946-50), 2,000,000 (the Korean War, 1950-53) and 
21,000 (the China-Vietnam War, 1979) in the first group. And in the second group war 
dead counted 95,000 (the Indo-Chinese War, 1945-54), 302,000 (the Civil War in South 
Vietnam, 1960-65), 24,000 (the Civil War in Laos, 1960-62 and 1963-73), 1,216,000 
(the Vietnam War, 1965-75), 156,000 (the Civil War in Cambodia, 1970-75), 50,000 
(the Vietnam-Cambodia War, 1975-91), and 21,000 (the China-Vietnam War, 1979). 
Since the 1980s, however, almost no serious war happened in the region. In Tanaka’s 
view, in the 1940s-50s, the causes of almost all wars were related to popular struggles 
for national liberation from the colonial status under Western dominance, and to 
attempts at building a new nation in each territory. But since such causes of war no 
longer existed, this type of war came to the end in the 1960s, the last of which was the 
Vietnam War. He sees a bright future for Asian international relations that is based on 
liberalism, underpinned by dynamic economies. Thus his observation also gives us a 
rationale for the emergent interstate system in East Asia. (Tanaka 1994) Assuredly, the 
Cold War became ‘hot’ in East Asia, overshadowing the struggles for national liberation 
there, when the global system was dominant over Asian regional systems. Even then, as 
shown in the above section, the dominant system could not nip all the regional 
initiatives by subsystems in the bud. 
Summing up the above discussions, independence of all Asian nations was the 
first prerequisite for the formation of an interstate system in East Asia. However, as 
long as the logic of the Cold War persisted, an autonomous interstate system in East 
Asia could not easily come out. Nevertheless, the demise of the Cold War system in the 
early 1990s brought about an important factor in the environment surrounding the Asian 
system, which would work positively toward its birth. Meanwhile, Southeast Asian 
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countries, Japan and China displayed a concerted diplomacy toward peace in Indochina 
in the late 1980s – the early 1990s. In retrospect, Southeast Asian countries had already 
promoted a kind of system building in East Asia by officially recognizing each other 
and other East Asian countries in the mid-1970s. In the background is the culture of 
developmentalism or the belief in economic growth that is shared by all those nations.  
 
4. Discourses on Asian Systems  
 
Here we shall juxtapose the interstate system in Asia in discourses on Asian systems, of 
which overlap, multiplicity, variety and flexibility are characteristics. For instance, 
Table 11 gives us a picture of ‘Multinational framework in Asia,’ in which the year of 
participation of each member country in ASEAN, ASEAN + 3, ARF, APEC, Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and ASEM is shown. This table has three sets of information. 
The first is to confirm the expansion process of each regime, informal or formal. What 
matters here is not what countries constitute these organizations, but the date when each 
member state took part in them. ASEAN started with the original five member states, 
including Brunei in 1984, three Indo-Chinese states and Myanmar in the late 1990s. 
This enlarged version of ASEAN came to encompass three major powers in Northeast 
Asia (Japan, South Korea, and China) within the framework of ‘ASEAN plus three’ in 
the late-1990s. ARF is a consultative body whose major objective is to create 
confidence-building measures. The original member states are most of ‘ASEAN plus 
three’, the US, Russia and others, whereas one of the new member states is North Korea 
(2000). It is obvious that those regimes started on the initiative of ASEAN, and 
expanded to include other nations, the original ASEAN members being the center. Thus 
the wind has begun to blow from the South in East Asia. 
Secondly, as shown in the table, the two economic regimes (APEC and ADB) 
have accepted Taiwan and Hong Kong as a full member. This is quite a contrast to the 
two political or military regimes (ASEAN+3, and ARF) that do not give them 
membership. We have two layered systems of politics and economics in this region. In 
other words, Asian systems are likely to be flexible, and so are their operators. The last 
message, drawn from the table, is that East Asia as a whole has become equal to the 
West in international politics and economics. In the economic sphere, APEC represents 
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the equal partnership between East Asia and the Americas. In the political sphere, 
ASEM typifies consultation on equality between East Asia and Europe. These two are 
unprecedented events in the modern history of Asia. 
Thus variety, multiplicity, and overlap are major features of Asian regional 
systems or regimes, and so is flexibility in their operation. In this connection, K. Hirano, 
who specializes in international relations in East Asia, remarks, ‘We need to take a view 
that treats not only traditional actors (a state or nation) but also “regional systems” (a 
new concept) as agents who make up international relations. Needless to say, the 
character of Asian international system changed radically in the modern era, but...it has 
in essence maintained its nature of “multiplicity” throughout the modern and 
contemporary history. Characteristically, it is regional systems in Asia that have 
generated the multiplicity of the international relations.’ (Hirano 1994: 3) He stresses 
the importance of multiplicity or historicity in Asian regional systems, contrasting it 
with the simplicity of the Western State System that regards only a territorial state or 
nation state as the single legitimate actor in the system, casting away the multiplicity. 
Moreover, he emphasizes the fact that there used to be spatial, temporal, historical and 
territorial multiplicity, and above all multi-centrality in Asia, as was observed in the 
‘Center-Periphery’ structure observed in the former Chinese World Order. These 
features can be a basis for setting up flexible and dynamic systems in the contemporary 
context. Specifically he notes the overlaps of contemporary systems at global, Asian 
(total), regional (East, Southeast, South and Islamic), sub-regional, national, 
sub-national, or individual levels (For example, overseas Chinese utilizing those 
overlapping systems in East Asia). S. Yamakage also emphasizes such a multiplicity of 
measures as APEC adopts for the purpose of regional cooperation. They are oriented 
toward cross- ideological (hence crossing social structures), cross-developmental (hence 
crossing the South/North line), multifarious and pragmatic (hence among various 
agents), and cross-cultural cooperation. In his view, multiplicity, variety and flexibility 
are considered as characteristics of Asian systems. (Yamakage 2000: 146-147) 
T. Shiraishi points out the socio-economic foundation of a regional interstate 
system in Asia. He regards Asia as being a regional system that generates, develops, 
ripens and destroys itself in history. He is interested in the historical formation of Asia 
as a region, and concerned with Japan’s position in it. (Shiraishi 2000: i) His historical 
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perspective has three layers: secular (five hundred years), long (one hundred fifty to two 
hundred years), and short (fifty years) trends. The secular trend refers to the traditional 
East Asia, which was sustained by the Chinese World Order and its tributary trading 
zones. Western entrepreneurial people were encroaching on it since the sixteenth 
century. From the perspective of two hundreds years or less, the area was characterized 
firstly by the gradual demise of the former order and trade system, and secondly the 
penetration of the Britain’s informal empire. That empire covered the maritime Asia, 
which stretched from Penang and Singapore, to Hong Kong, Amoy, and Shanghai, as 
commercially and militarily strategic ports, and formed a network connecting these 
ports. Lastly, for fifty years after the War, the maritime East Asia has been dominated by 
an American informal empire (or Free Asia). In the politico-economic structure, the US 
has exerted the hegemony so as to contain Mainland China and restore Japanese 
economy. Its major tool is the security system comprising the US working as a hub, and 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand and the former South Vietnam 
playing as the role of spokes. The US is the center of the triangular trade system 
consisting of the US itself, Japan and other East Asian countries. In that system, the 
function of Japan is to accept the status of half a sovereignty, to act as a workshop of 
Asia, and to play the role of a junior partner to the US. Economically, Japan has led the 
region, flying at the front of those flying geese of East Asian countries. ‘The great 
success in economic development induced East Asian countries to promote 
regionalizaion, so that “East Asia” became one region. The engine was not regionalism 
such as APEC or ASEAN, but the economic development in this region.’ (Shiraishi 
2000: 178 Emphasis added) 
Y. Hara develops an argument, which is in a sense similar to those of Hirano, 
Yamakage and Shiraishi. He is an economist who has studied the development of East 
Asian, especially Southeast Asian economies from the standpoint distinct from the 
neo-classical development economics. In his view, Japanese discourses on the 
Japan-Asian relationship have centered around two axes of civilization and 
development, both of which are now out of use. The point at issue is not the 
confrontation between the Western and the Asian civilizations, but between the 
dominance of global, especially financial capitalism on the one hand, and the reaction of 
culture of each region to it on the other. According to Hara, furthermore, it is time that 
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we should also abandon the idea of ‘stages of development,’ because such a framework 
as the conflict between an advanced Japan and a developing Asia has lost relevancy. 
The story of ‘flying geese’ has already ended. Hara continues that we should search 
after common elements among us so as to create the paradigm on a regional order in 
East Asia. This is not only distinct from an imperialistic or Asianistic approach but also 
an easy belief in the omnipotence of market economy. One alternative way he 
recommends is to re-appraise the utility of human networks of Asian economies in 
production, trade and financing. (Hara 2000: v-vi, 125; Hara 2001: 7-8, 21) Thus he 
stresses the systemic nature of Asian economies. Summing up the discussions in this 
section, the author argues that an interstate system in Asia is a part of multifarious 
overlapping regional systems.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
An interstate system has been emerging in East Asia since the early 1990s. In this 
system all nations are now equals. Among the member states, the economic 
stratification is collapsing rapidly. Accordingly, the central role of Japan in the region is 
decreasing. Now our problem is not how to build a bridge between Japan as a leader and 
other Asian countries as counterparts, but how to create networks placing Japan as one 
of many equals in the region. Next, we would raise a question of how Japanese people 
have reacted to such a change in the surrounding environment. 
Japan was the only Power in the pre-War Asia. As a result, this old image 
lingers on even in contemporary discourses on the Japan’s relations with other Asian 
nations. One example is those arguments that evaluate positively the history of Japan’s 
relations with the rest of Asia as that of the ‘liberation’ of Asian peoples from Western 
dominance. Y. Wakamiya, a journalist from Asahi Shimbun (newspaper), examines in 
his book the views about Asia taken by Japanese prime ministers (conservative) in the 
post-War period, and summarizes them as follows. 
 
In Japanese views on Asia, while the traditional idea of ‘Leave Asia and join the West’ 
proposed by Y. Fukuzawa in 1884 still stubbornly persists, the visions of the ‘Greater East 
Asian Co-prosperity Sphere’ or the aspiration after a ‘Greater Asia’ has not yet passed away. 
Post-War Japanese politics looks away from the scars on Asian peoples left by pre-War 
Japan. Is it indebted to them for its own misdeeds? Or is it seeking to hear their Romantic 
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voices? Essentially, while being predicated on historical continuity, these views have come 
to be conditioned to a great extent by the Cold-War structure in the post-War era. Has 
Japanese politics faced Asia, setting the ‘settlement of its colonial rule and aggression’ as a 
vertical axis and ‘the East-West confrontation’ as a horizontal one? Thus, in tandem with the 
collapse of the horizontal axis, the voice for the ‘Age of Asia’ has become much stronger. 
Nevertheless, under these circumstances, Japanese views on Asia seem to be stuck in a state 
of confusion and embarrassment, being unaware of the time and necessity for their great 
transformation. (Wakamiya 1995: 4)  
 
As Wakamiya notes in the above, Japanese discourses on its relations with the 
rest of Asia are predicated upon a mixture of true and illusionary images of Asia. In this 
regard, Hara observes, ‘When the economic crisis struck East Asia toward the end of 
the twentieth century,…the global market raised its voices in chorus for modifying the 
crony type of Asian economic system from the foundations. This is the reappearance of 
the worn-out idea that we should now leave Asia and join the West….There were other 
loud voices as well. They shouted that we should now unite ourselves as Asian people, 
against the global project for American finance capitalism pursued by a complex of 
Wall Street and the Treasury. This is nothing but the reappearance of Pan-Asianism. 
Both ‘Leave Asia and join the West’ and Pan-Asianism were intellectual products that 
could not be supported by academic findings in “area studies.” It is absolutely necessary 
that we should recognize the contemporary intellectual situations surrounding these two 
kinds of worn-out arguments for and against Asian solidarity.’ (Hara 2201: 228) Besides, 
T. Aoki, specializing in cultural anthropology of Asian societies, remarks, 
‘Pan-Asianists are those exponents of Asia who have very flat images of Asia. 
Protagonists for the “Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere” have had very thin 
interest in and perceptions of Asian societies and cultures.’ (Aoki 1999: 37). Professors 
Yamakage, Shiraishi, Hara and Aoki are all specialists on Southeast Asian affairs, who 
stress the importance of ‘area studies’ as intellectual bulwarks against the chauvinistic 
Pan-Asianism in Japan. 
However, even when we used to argue for a prosperous Asia in the future, our 
illusions about Asia went far ahead of its reality.  In retrospect, in the 1950s the strong 
voices for solidarity among Asian and African nations were heard and they sounded 
very nice at that time. But in accordance with the formation of Asian systems, Asia and 
Africa seem to have lost most of their emotional ties. (Kajihara 1999) This is a side 
effect of the formation of an Asian interstate system. The old optimism resulted from a 
lack of information on Asian societies, cultures or people, Chinese studies being the 
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sole exception. For example, we paid little attention to ethnic problems inherent in 
Asian countries in the 1950s. In the 1960s, area studies on Southeast Asia started to fill 
in academic blanks in Japan. Still our intellectual blanks remain to be filled on a real 
Asia. 
The author has tried to verify the formation of an interstate system in East Asia. 
Although this work is not so well founded as those of area studies, hopefully it has filled 
at least one missing point in arguments about international system in Asia. As 
mentioned above, Professors Yamakage, Shiraishi, and Hara, along with Professor 
Hirano, all regard an Asian region as containing local international or world systems. In 
their views, each of them possesses an integrity but their functions are flexible, multiple 
or overlapping. Although the current Asian interstate system is uni-dimensional, short 
of flexibility, it is thought to constitute a very important basis of other Asian regional 
systems. 
Finally Kim Bong-jin, a Korean specialist in Asian international relations, 
raises three points of reference to look at Asia from the eyes of Asian people. The first 
is to take more multinational than national viewpoints. Secondly, he recommends that 
we think in a comparative and comprehensive way so that we can see both the positive 
and negative aspects of the pre-modern (traditional) and modern eras. Lastly he 
emphasizes the necessity of finding out a way to de-construct the West-centered 
modernism or Orientalism in international politics, international relations and other 
social science fields. (Kim 2000: 127-128) One answer to the problems raised by him 
would be the discovery of the emergent interstate system in the region that this paper 
addresses. 
 
 
(This paper is a revised version of ‘Formation of international systems in East Asia’ 
delivered at Conference on National, Regional and Global Transition: A Common 
Agenda for Anglo-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century, Shrigley Hall near 
Manchester, UK, 7 September 2001.) 
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Table 1: J apan's foreign relationship
 1940s-1950s         1960s       1970s       1980s      1990s-
S . K orea            … … … … … 65* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 　
N. K orea           ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
M ongol           /////////////////////////72* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
China           ////////////////////////72* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Taiwan            52* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 72…………………………………………………
N/Vietnam           /////////////////////////73* * * * * * 78(* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * )91* * * * * * * * * * *
S . Vietnam            53* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 76
                       neutral              Lon Nol  Pol PotU nder Vietnam U NTA C/after
Cambodia            53* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 70* * * 75* * * * 79////////////////92* * * * * * * * * * *
Laos      (51)…53* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Thailand    　　52* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
M yanmar        52* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
M alaysia                  57* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
S ingapore 　　　　65* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Indonesia          (51)… 58* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Brunei         84* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Philippines          (51)… 56* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
U S A 　　45…51* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
S U /Russia                 56* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
source: K indai Nihon S ougou Nenpyo (2nd ed.)
note: * * * * * (formal relationship), …….(informal relationship), /////(no relationship)
      (* * * * * )(frozen relationship)
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Table 2: S . K orea's foreign relationship
 1940s-1950s         1960s       1970s       1980s      1990s-
J apan           …………………65* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
N. K orea           ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
M ongol           //////////////////////////////////////////////////90* * * * * * * * * * * *
China           ///////////////////////////////////////////////////92* * * * * * * * * *
Taiwan          * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 92……………
N/Vietnam           ////////////////////////////////////////////////////92* * * * * * * * * *
S . Vietnam         * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 76
Cambodia                     neutral                Lon Nol  Pol PotU nder Vietnam U NTA C/after
        ///////////////////////70* * * 75* * * * 79///////////////////////97* * *
Laos          * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 75///////////////////////////95* * * * * *
Thailand         /////58* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
M yanmar          ////////////////////////////75* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
M alaysia          /////////60* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
S ingapore           65///////////75* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Indonesia         /////////////////////////73* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Brunei         84* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Philippines        49* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
U S A 　　  …48* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
S U /Russia          ///////////////////////////////////////////////////90* * * * * * * * * *
source: S ekai Nenkan
           K ankoku K itachosen S oran (1993)
note: * * * * * (formal relationship), ……(informal relationship), /////(no relationship)
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Table 3: N. K orea's foreign relationship
 1940s-1950s         1960s       1970s       1980s      1990s-
J apan            ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
S . K orea            ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
M ongol           48* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
China           49* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Taiwan           //////////////////////////////////////////////////91………………
N./Vietnam            50* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
S . Vietnam          //////////////////////////////76
Cambodia                  neutral                    Lon Nol  Pol PotU nder Vietnam U NTA C/after
         /////////////64* * * * * * * * 70///74* * * * * 79//////////////91* * * * * * * * * * *
Laos          ////////////63//////////////74* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Thailand          /////////////////////////////75* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
M yanmar         /////////////////////////////75* * * * * * * * * * 83/////////////////////
M alaysia          //////////////////////////73* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
S ingapore           65////////////75* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Indonesia           /////////////64* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Brunei        84////////////////99* * *
Philippines           /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////00*
U S A           ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
S U /Russia           48* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
source: S ekai Nenkan
          Tonan-ajia Yoran
          K ankoku K itachosen S oran (1993)
note: * * * * * (formal relationship), ……(informal relationship), /////(no relationship)
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Table 4: China's foreign relationship
 1940s-1950s       1960s       1970s       1980s      1990s-
Japan           /////////////////////// 72**************************************
S. Korea           ///////////////////////////////////////////////// 92**********
N. Korea       49******************************************** ***************** *************
Mongol       49******************/////71**************************90***********
Taiwan          //////////////////////////////////////////////////91……………
N/Vietnam       50**********************************79 /////////////91***********
S. Vietnam         /////////////////////// 76
                     netural               Lon Nol  Pol PotUnder VietnamUNTAC/after
Cambodia          53///58***************70////75****79//////////////90************
Laos 　　　　　　54/////61**64/////////////75*******80/////////88**************
Thailand        /////////////////////////////75**********************************
Myanmar         50*****************/////*****************************************
Malaysia         /////////////////////74**************************** *************
Singapore            65//////////////////////////////////90***********
Indonesia　　　　50****************67///////////////////////////////90***********
Brunei       84/////////91***********91***********
Philippines         ////////////////////////////75**********************************
USA          ////////////////////////72…………79 ****************************
SU/Russia　　　　49*******************69//////////////////////////89**************
source: Sekai Nenkan
note: *****(formal relationship), ……(informal relationship), /////(no relationship)
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Table 5: North Vietnam's and Vietnam's foreign (since 1976) relationship
 1940s-1950s       1960s       1970s       1980s      1990s-
Japan            ////////////////////////73*****78(***************)91************
S. Korea            ///////////////////////////////////////////////////92**********
N. Korea           50**************************************************************
Mongol           ****************************************************************
China           50********************************79///////////////91***********
Taiwan           ///////////////////////////////////////////////////91……………
                     neutral               Lon Nol  Pol Pot  Under VietnamUNTAC/after
Cambodia          **********************70///75**77//79**************91***********
Laos           ???57///62/////////////////75***********************************
Thailand          ////////////////////////////76****79(********)87****************
Myanmar          ///////////////////////////75***********************************
Malaysia         ///////////////////////////75******79(**********)88**************
Singapore                             　 　65/////////73********79(***********)91***********
Indonesia        ///////////64*65//////////////76****79(*********)87***************
Brunei 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　       　  84///////92**********
Philippines         /////////////////////////////76****79(**************)92**********
USA         /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////95******
SU/Russia       50***************************************************************
source: Sekai Nenkan
          Tonan-ajia Yoran
note: *****(formal relationship), ……(informal relationship), /////(no relationship)
         (****)(frozen relationship)
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Table 6: M alaysia's foreign relationship
 1940s-1950s         1960s       1970s       1980s      1990s-
J apan                   57* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
S . K orea                         60* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
N. K orea                             63////////////73* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
M ongol                             63//////////71* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
China                             63///////////////74* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Taiwan                            63///////////////74……………………………………………
N/Vietnam                            63////////////////75* * * * 79(* * * * * * * * * * * * * )91* * * * * * * * * *
S . Vietnam                            63* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 76
Cambodia                          neutral            Lon Nol  Pol PotU nder Vietnam U NTA C/after
                             //////////70* * * 75/76* * 79/////////////91* * * * * * * * * * * *
Laos                             //66* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Thailand                             63* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
M yanmar                             63* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
S ingapore 　　　　65* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Indonesia                           63* 64//66* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Brunei         84* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Philipines                           63//66* * * 68/69* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
U S A                            63* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
S U /Russia                            63///67* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
source: Sekai Nenkan
          Tonan-ajia S oran
note: * * * * * (formal relationship), ……(informal relationship), /////(no relationship)
      (* * * * * )(frozen relationship)
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Table 7: Matrix (1965)
SU NV NK CH CB BM IN TW SK ML SG PH TH JP US
Soviet Union *  *  *  /  *  *  /  /  /  /  /  *  *  *
N.Vietnam *  *  *  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /
N. Korea  *  *  *  *  /  *  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /
China  *  *  *  *  *  *  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /
Cambodia /  /  *  *  *  *  /  /  /  /  *  /  *  /
Burma  *  /  /  *  *   *  /  /  *  *  *  *  *  *
Indonesia *  /  *  *  *  *  /  /  /  /  *  *  *  *
Taiwan  /  /  /   /  /  /  /  *  /  /  /  /  *  *
S. Korea  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  *  *  /  *  *  *  *
Malaysia /  /  /  /  /  *  /  /  *  *  /  *  *  *
Singapore /  /  /  /  /  *  /  /  /  *  *  /  *  *
Philippines /  /  /  /  *  *  *  /  *  /  *  *  *  *
Thailand *  /  /  /  /  *  *  /  *  *  /  *  *  *
Japan  *  /  /  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
USA  *  /  /  /  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  
note: *(formal relationship), /(no formal relationship)
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Table 8: Matrix (1976)
SU CH NK VT CB BM ML TH SG IN PH JP SK TW US
Soviet Union /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  /  /  *
China  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  /  /  *  *  /  /  /
N. Korea  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  /  /  /  /  /
Vietnam *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  /  /  /
Cambodia *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  /  *  *  *  /  *
Burma  *  *  *  *  *   *  *  *  *  *  *  *  /  *
Malaysia *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  /  *
Thailand *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  /  *
Singapore *  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  /  *
Indonesia *  /  *  *  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  /  *
Philippines *  *  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  /  *
Japan  *  *  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  /  *
S. Korea  /  /  /  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
Taiwan  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  *  *
USA  *  /  /  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
note: *(formal relationship), /(no formal relationship)
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Table 9: Matrix (1985)
TW CB VT NK CH SK SG IN JP TH ML PH BM US SU
Taiwan  /  /  /  /  *  *  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /
Cambodia /  *  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  *  /  *
Vietnam /  *  *  /  / (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)  *  /  *
N. Korea  /  /  *  *  /  *  *  /  *  *  /  /  /  *
China  /  /  /  *  /  /  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  /
S. Korea  *  /  /  /  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  /
Singapore *  / (*)  *  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
Indonesia /  / (*)  *  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
Japan  /  / (*)  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
Thailand /  / (*)  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
Malaysia /  / (*)  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
Philippines /  / (*)  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
Burma  /  *  *  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *   *  *
USA  /  /  /  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *   *
Soviet Union /  *  *  *  /  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
note: *(formal relationship), /(no formal relationship), (*)(frozen relationship)
 
 - 103 - 
Table 10: Matrix (2000)
TW NK JP SK CH VT CB TH MM ML SG IN PH US RS
Taiwan  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /
N. Korea  /  /  /  *  *  *  *  /  *  *  *  *  /  *
Japan  /  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
S. Korea  /  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
China  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
Vietnam /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
Cambodia /  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
Thailand /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
Myanmar  /  /  *  *  *  *  *  *   *  *  *  *  *  *
Malaysia /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
Singapore /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
Indonesia /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
Philippines /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
USA  /  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *   *
Russia  /  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
note: *(formal relationship), /(no formal relationship)
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Table 11: M ultinational frameworks in A sia (the first year of each membership)       
A S EA N A S EA N+3 A RF A FTA A PEC A D B A S E M
J apan 97 94 89 66 96
S . K orea 97 94 89 66 96
N. K orea 2000
M ongol 1998 1991
China 97 94 1991 1986 96
Taiwan 1991 66
Hong K ong 1991 1969
Vietnam 1995 97 94 1995 1998 66 96
Cambodia 1999 97 1995 1995 66
Laos 1997 97 94 1997 66
Thailand 67 97 94 92 89 66 96
M yanmar 1997 97 1996 1997 1973
M alaysia 67 97 94 92 89 66 96
S ingapore 67 97 94 92 89 66 96
Indonesia 67 97 94 92 89 66 96
Brunei 1984 97 94 89 96
Philippines 67 97 94 92 89 66 96
U S A 94 89 66
S U /Russia 94 1998
Canada 94 89 66
A ustralia 94 89 66
New Zealand 94 89 66
EU 94 96
India 1996 66
PNG 94 1993 1971
Bangladesh 1973
S ri Lanka 66
other A merican countries (3) 1993 - 98
other A sia-Pacific countries (23) 66 - 1999
European countries (14) 66 - 1991
EU  member　countries (15) 96
note: a founding member (1900 omited);  a newly joining member (1900 added)         
